"Over two decades of crisis management in Iraq, arguably the most dangerous moment was when the scene seemed unusually calm."
It is precisely at these moments that decisions are made that seem timely and practical, but that carry within them the seeds of later harsh tests.
What happened in the administration of the last government entitlement cannot be read as a competition of names or locations, but rather as a reflection of the way the decision is shaped at a very sensitive stage.
When the decision is taken within the coordination framework by a majority rather than a unanimous vote, it does not only mean different points of view, but also reveals an erosion of trust within the coalition itself.
In the Iraqi experience, decisions that go through this way are nominally stable, but fragile at the first crisis.
Transferring the center of gravity to the executive government by expanding its powers or burdens is not in itself a guarantee of stability. Experience suggests that too much executive power, with too little political cover, turns any service or administrative failure into a full-blown political crisis. In a country like Iraq, where services overlap with legitimacy, daily functioning becomes part of the battle for trust, not just an administrative matter.
At the regional level, it is understandable that political forces seek to secure support umbrellas in a moment of widespread unrest. But the same experience shows that external support does not address the lack of internal acceptance, but rather often raises the sensitivity of the decision and reduces the margin of decline. What is buying time today could double the cost tomorrow if it is not backed up by broader internal understanding.
The silence of reference at this stage should not be understood as absence or satisfaction, but as a realistic message: the priority of confronting the major risks, with the political forces being held fully responsible for their choices and results. "In such circumstances, one of the most important tools for calming the street and absorbing crises is absent, and each lapse becomes a direct test of the regime's resilience."
In contrast, the danger arises of forces that are outside the existing system of understandings and have the ability to act without bearing the burden of governance. These forces do not need to overthrow the government as much as they can gradually weaken it, by capitalizing on failures and recalling the memory of the conflict. The Iraqi experience has shown that the most serious conflicts are those that arise within the same component over who represents the people and who represents the state.
In conclusion, the current stage does not tolerate managing the dispute with the logic of scoring points or imposing facts. Stability in Iraq was never the result of a single decision, but rather the result of delicate balances and containment mechanisms accumulated through trial and error. Any flaw in these mechanisms does not appear immediately, but it accumulates silently until the first normal test turns into a crisis greater than everyone's ability to control. The question that is supposed to be asked today, within each decision circle, is not how to pass this stage, but how to prevent the next one from being much harder than we imagine.
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